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NOTE
MOURNING THE UNTIMELY DEATH OF THE JUVENILE DEATH
PENALTY: AN EXAMINATION OF ROPER v. SIMMONS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
"By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the au-
thoritative conscience of the Nation?"1
I. INTRODUCTION
Juveniles have historically committed horrific, cold, and calcu-
lated murders in this country, ending the lives of many innocent vic-
tims and destroying the lives of loved ones left behind. In 1978, sev-
enteen-year-old Timothy Davis went to Avis Alford's store, where he
sodomized and stabbed the sixty-eight-year-old seventeen times.2 In
1989, Helen Rhodes came home with her two-year-old son to find
seventeen-year-old William Thomas Knotts in her home.' Knotts shot
Rhodes twice, took her purse, and left her son crying in his mother's
blood.4 In 1994, Kenneth Loggins and Trace Duncan, both seventeen-
years-old, took Vickie Deblieux to a secluded area, threw bottles at
her, stomped on her for thirty minutes until she died, played with her
lifeless body, and threw her over a cliff.5 As of 2005, these four mur-
derers were sitting on death row. 6
Sadly, the facts surrounding the recent U.S. Supreme Court case,
Roper v. Simmons,7 are just as chilling. In September of 1993, seven-
teen-year-old Christopher Simmons broke into Shirley Crook's home
in the middle of the night after telling his friends he wanted to commit
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Davis v. State, 554 So. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (Ala. Crirn. App. 1984).
3. Knotts v. State, 686 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
4. Id. at 442-43.
5. Loggins v. State, 771 So. 2d 1070, 1074 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Duncan v. State,
827 So. 2d 838, 840-41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999).
6. Brief of the States of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 9-
10, 12-13, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 865268 [hereinaf-
ter Brief of Alabama].
7. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
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murder.8 Simmons and an accomplice bound Ms. Crook's hands,
wrapped her face in duct tape, drove her to a rural area, and pushed
her off of a railroad trestle into the river below.9 Ms. Crook left be-
hind a husband and daughter, who both testified at Simmons' trial
about the devastating effects of this senseless crime.10 Simmons was
sentenced to death, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed his sen-
tence, ruling that it was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
to sentence anyone under the age of eighteen to death."'
In Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the Missouri Su-
preme Court and held that sentencing an offender to death who was
under eighteen-years-old at the time of the crime is cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 2 This case will arguably
be celebrated by many respected organizations in this country, as well
as the world community, 3 but the ramifications of this plurality deci-
sion may be far-reaching.
The Roper Court heavily relied on scientific evidence and interna-
tional opinion, while ignoring the lack of a national consensus against
the juvenile death penalty. " There is no national consensus against
this practice-in fact, states are widely split."' Many state legislatures
reserved the death penalty as an appropriate sentence when the crime
was especially calculated and horrific,' 6 such as Simmons' offense. In
addition, the Court implied in Roper that juries are incapable of prop-
erly weighing mitigating factors in juvenile homicide cases. 17 As a re-
sult, the Court took the death penalty away from the discretion of leg-
islatures and juries and interfered with core political government
processes.
In its opinion, the Roper Court made many general conclusions
about the characteristics of juveniles as a class to justify its decision
8. Id. at 556; Brief for Petitioner at 3, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
903158 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
9. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4.
10. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
11. Id. at 558-60.
12. Id. at 578-79.
13. See discussion infra Parts II.B.3, II.B.4 and accompanying notes.
14. See infra Part ffI.B for an explanation of the Court's analysis in Roper.
15. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (noting that twelve states have abandoned the death pen-
alty and eighteen states that allow the death penalty exclude juveniles).
16. See id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that many state legislatures
concluded that the death penalty was appropriate for "at least some 17-year-old murderers").
17. See id. at 573 (majority opinion).
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holding the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional.' 8 As a result,
Roper could affect the practice and philosophy of the juvenile justice
system. The Court's decision in Roper may open the door for other
sentences imposed on juvenile offenders to be deemed unconstitu-
tional. More broadly, the United States may begin to see a shift in the
philosophy and focus of the juvenile justice system back to one of re-
habilitation, rather than punishment or retribution.
The purpose of this Note is to explore and explain the Court's rul-
ing in Roper v. Simmons and to discuss the impact the case may have
on future Eighth Amendment cases and the current juvenile justice
system. Part II gives a history of the juvenile justice system in the
United States and explores the development of the Court's analysis in
past death penalty cases. Part III focuses on the Court's analysis in
Roper, including both dissenting opinions. In Part IV, this Note ana-
lyzes the Court's holding in Roper and suggests how it may affect the
juvenile justice system in the future. Part V concludes that as a result
of Roper, states may change how juveniles are treated in the adult
criminal system, and other adult sentences imposed on juveniles may
be deemed unconstitutional.
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. History of the Juvenile Justice System-From
Rehabilitation to Retribution
Over the past two centuries, the U. S. juvenile justice system has
continually evolved according to current societal views about how to
treat juvenile delinquents. 9 At the time of this country's founding,
older adolescent offenders were frequently processed through the
adult criminal court system. 20 However, social reformers in the 1800s
were influential in establishing institutions for these juveniles that fo-
cused on rehabilitation instead of retribution alone.2' Although reha-
18. Id. at 569-70 (noting that juveniles (1) are immature and have an "underdeveloped
sense of responsibility," (2) "are more vulnerable or susceptible to ... peer pressure," and (3)
have personality traits that are "transitory").
19. See THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3-4 (1992) (purporting
that juvenile justice policies in this country have followed a cyclical pattern over the past two
hundred years).
20. See David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer:
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1558-59 (2004); Jenni-
fer Seibring Marcotte, Death Penalty for Minors: Who Should Decide?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 621,
623 (1996).
21. See Brink, supra note 20, at 1558-59.
289
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bilitation is still the stated purpose of most states' juvenile courts, al-
most all states allow juveniles of various ages to be tried in adult
criminal court and receive adult sentences. 22 Today, the juvenile jus-
tice system is much different than the idealistic rehabilitative model of
the 1800s.
Under the common law, children under seven-years-old were con-
clusively presumed to have no capacity for criminal intent.23 A rebut-
table presumption existed that children between the ages of seven and
fourteen could not possess criminal intent, but juveniles over the age
of fourteen were liable for any criminal act, for they were presumed to
possess the requisite intent.24 Therefore, any child over seven-years-
old, if found to possess criminal intent, could be arrested, brought to
trial, and punished as an adult criminal. 25  Anyone who committed
homicide, including juveniles, could receive a mandatory death sen-
tence.26
In the early 1800s, the United States emerged as an industrialized
nation, and families increasingly abandoned their agrarian, small-town
lifestyles for a more urban setting. 7 As a result, in the larger cities,
groups of children began to form who were homeless, poor, and fight-
ing for survival.28 In response to this social problem, social reformers
in 1825 instituted the first juvenile facility of its kind, the New York
House of Refuge.219 The House of Refuge sought to prevent poverty
and delinquency among New York's youth by requiring the children
to work eight hours a day and go to school four hours a day.3" In the
following years, many cities began to emulate New York's model, and
22. See id. at 1562-63; Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is
There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 57,62-63,68-69 (1992).
23. Marcotte, supra note 20, at 622-23 (explaining that the death penalty was adminis-
tered differentially, depending on the child's age) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1792)).
24. Id.; see Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches
to the Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 563, 566 (1996).
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (citing Julian Mack, The Chancery Procedure in
the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 310 (1925)); Marcotte, supra
note 20, at 623.
26. Marcotte, supra note 20, at 623 ("The application of the death penalty to individuals
who were under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes has historically been
acceptable.").
27. BERNARD, supra note 19, at 46; see also Brink, supra note 20, at 1559 ("Industriali-
zation and urbanization in the nineteenth century and the emergence of charitable organiza-
tions contributed to new ideas about the education and socialization of children ... .
28. BERNARD, supra note 19, at 47.
29. Id. at 62.
30. Id. at 63-64.
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by 1868 over twenty similar organizations housed between 40,000 and
50,000 youths throughout the country.3
The first official juvenile court was established in 1899 in Cook
County, Illinois.3 2 Central to its inception were the ideals of social re-
formers who were appalled at the way juveniles were treated in adult
court.3 3 These reformers, who were mostly women, campaigned for a
separate court system for juvenile offenders that focused primarily on
rehabilitation.3 4 In their view, juveniles were fundamentally different
than adults. 35 Therefore, because juveniles were immature and vul-
nerable they should not be punished as adult criminals.36 Within
twenty-five years, all but two states had developed a separate court for
juvenile offenders.37 In the reformers' view, these new court systems
would prevent later criminal activity by intervening earlier in a juve-
nile's life.38
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court heard several land-
mark juvenile cases, granting juvenile offenders many of the same due
process rights afforded adults in court.3 9 Until this time, juvenile
courts operated with less formality than adult courts, and juveniles had
minimal procedural rights.' But during this era, many began to be-
lieve the juvenile courts' focus on rehabilitation was not adequate or
effective because it failed to impede the rising juvenile crime rate.41
31. Id. at 70.
32. Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
33. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 150 (1989); see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (explaining the prevailing view at the time of society's role in administering
juvenile justice).
34. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 ("The idea of crime and punishment was to be aban-
doned. The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from apprehen-
sion through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive."); Lanes, 767
S.W.2d at 791 ("The philosophical basis of this separation was to create a system wherein ju-
veniles were rehabilitated rather than incarcerated, protected rather than punished-the very
antithesis of the adult criminal system."); BERNARD, supra note 19, at 85-86.
35. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
36. Brink, supra note 20, at 1559; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution
of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143 (1997).
37. Alexander v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 781 (D.S.C. 1995).
38. Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 144 ("[T]he belief was that the delinquent youth
was on a path to a criminal career, from which he could be diverted, through rehabilitation, or
toward which he would proceed without appropriate intervention.").
39. See Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (discussing juveniles' basic constitutional rights); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (focusing on waiver of jurisdiction in juvenile court);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (focusing on juvenile court proceedings and
the right to trial by jury); see also Brink, supra note 20, at 1559-60.
40. Brink, supra note 20, at 1559.
41. Fritsch & Henmens, supra note 24, at 567 (citing M.A. BORTNER, INSIDE A
JUVENILE COURT 5-7 (1982)); Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 145 ("[T]he changes grew out
of mounting skepticism about the empirical premise that rehabilitation was effective with
5
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In 1966, the Supreme Court heard In re Gault42 and held that ju-
veniles are entitled to basic constitutional due process rights, such as
the right to notice of charges, the right to an attorney, the right to ex-
amine witnesses, and the right to remain silent.43 The Court did not
believe that giving due process rights to juvenile offenders would un-
dermine the juvenile court's foundational goal of rehabilitation,44 and
the Court still found a sufficient fundamental difference between ju-
veniles and adults to warrant upholding the institution of juvenile
court.4 5
Although the decision in Gault was a positive step toward provid-
ing procedural safeguards to juveniles in court, juvenile courts began
to take the form of adult criminal court. In response to this shift, leg-
islators began to re-think the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile
court.46 If courts treated juveniles the same as adults procedurally,
many felt juveniles should also be held responsible for their crimes as
adults.47
During the 1980s and 1990s, the public became increasingly fear-
ful as the juvenile crime rate began to rise dramatically. 48 In this post-
Gault era, lawmakers began focusing on the specific offenses juve-
niles committed and the harm inflicted on victims, instead of targeting
what was best for the juvenile.49 In 1995, Professor John Dilulio
added to this general fear with an article describing the coming of
youthful offenders."); see also Marcotte, supra note 20, at 631 (noting that in the 1980s and
1990s, juvenile courts were perceived as ineffective at deterring juvenile crime).
42. Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (argued before the Court on December 6, 1966, and decided May
15, 1967).
43. Alexander v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 781 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing and summarizing
the holding of Gault).
44. Robert M. Donley, Criminal Law-Juvenile Justice Goals in Conflict with Protec-
tion of Society--United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1988), 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1341,
1343 (1989) (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 17-31).
45. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1113-14 (1991) (explain-
ing the Court's disposition in Gault).
46. See JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL
COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 88-89 (1998); Fritsch & Hemmens, supra
note 24, at 568-69; Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 145.
47. Sharon Ongerth, Note, Deference to the Majority: Why Isn't the Supreme Court Ap-
plying the Reasoning of Atkins v. Virginia to Juveniles?, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 483, 489
(2003); Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 145; see also Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 24, at
564 ("There is an increasing trend toward handling juvenile offenders in a manner similar to
their adult counterparts.").
48. Brink, supra note 20. at 1555.
49. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 147. See generally Patricia Allard & Malcolm
Young, Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court: Perspectives for Policymakers &
Practitioners, 2 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 65 (2002), available at http://www.sentencing-
project.org/pdfs/2079.pdf.
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"super-predators."5 In his article, Dilulio warned that "[on the hori-
zon, there[] are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished
juvenile super-predators .... So for as long as their youthful energies
hold out, they will do what comes 'naturally': murder, rape, rob, as-
sault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high."51 He resolved that
the only way to control this group of super-predators was to enact
harsher "get-tough law enforcement strategies."52 Dilulio testified be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee, finding an attentive audience in
both the legislature and the media.53
An evident conflict arose between two important policies underly-
ing society's notions of criminal justice.54 On one hand, legislators
wanted to preserve the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice sys-
tem; but on the other hand, they wanted to protect society from dan-
gerous criminals.55 Instead of viewing offenders under eighteen-
years-old as vulnerable, impulsive kids, many began to recognize and
emphasize the violent and horrific crimes these kids were capable of
committing.56 Legislators enacted sentencing provisions that focused
more on retribution than rehabilitation, and, as a result, the main prin-
ciples of the juvenile justice system began to gradually shift toward a
more retributive model.57
To appease society's fear, legislatures and courts increasingly re-
lied on either judicial or statutory waivers, sending juveniles to adult
court from juvenile court or requiring that juveniles who committed
certain crimes be tried in adult court exclusively.58 The term "judicial
waiver" describes the process of taking a juvenile offender out of the
juvenile court's jurisdiction, placing him in the jurisdiction of the
regular adult criminal court, and treating the offender as if he were an
adult.59 Statutory waiver places juvenile offenders who commit cer-
50. John J. Dilulio. The Comin of the Suver-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27,
1995, at 23, available at http://www.mcsm.org/predator.html.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Allard & Young, supra note 49.
54. Donley, supra note 44, at 1344-45.
55. Id.
56. See Marcotte, supra note 20, at 631 ("Trial courts are seeing and will continue to
see an increasing number of violent juvenile criminals.... Crimes committed by juveniles
are increasingly violent and increasingly sophisticated.").
57. See Ainsworth, supra note 45, at 1105 (stating that the juvenile criminal justice sys-
tem's focus shifted from rehabilitation to retribution); Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 24, at
569 ("State legislatures began to respond to the criticisms of the existing criminal justice sys-
tem and the calls to 'get tough on crime."'); Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 147.
58. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 24, at 569.
59. Id. at 570. In most cases, a juvenile offender will, before trial, attend a transfer pro-
ceeding in juvenile court where the juvenile court judge will consider a variety of factors as to
293
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tain crimes under the adult criminal court's jurisdiction immediately,
thus "bypassing the juvenile court altogether."'  In the 1980s and
1990s, the United States saw an increase in the rate at which juveniles
were transferred to adult court and a decrease in the age requirement
for statutory and judicial waiver.6
Today, juveniles as young as fourteen-years-old may be tried as
adults in regular criminal court.62 Most states have approved tougher
juvenile crime laws; by 1999, twenty-nine states had some form of
mandatory transfer statute.63 Once a juvenile offender is in adult
court, sentences may be more severe, 64 and the worst offenders may be
sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. 65 Also, until
2005, a juvenile offender found guilty of homicide was eligible for the
death penalty.'
The juvenile justice system was born out of a desire to change the
way society views and treats juvenile offenders. 67 But today, gradual
changes over the years have culminated in a juvenile justice system
that looks very different than it did at its inception. Its future course is
yet to be determined.
whether the accused should or should not be transferred to adult court. Brink, supra note 20,
at 1563. The judge will usually consider the age of the offender, his or her maturity, any prior
record, and the seriousness of the crime committed before making a decision regarding trans-
fer. Id.; see also CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006).
60. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 24, at 579; see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 62B.330
(2003). Nevada's statute provides that the following crimes are not considered delinquent
acts, and the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over a juvenile committing any of these
acts: (1) murder or attempted murder, (2) sexual assault or attempted sexual assault, (3) any
offense involving the use of a firearm, or (4) a felony resulting in death or serious bodily in-
jury to the victim. Id.
61. Brink, supra note 20, at 1555. In the last twenty years, a national trend has emerged
to transfer juvenile offenders to adult criminal court. "[J]uveniles are being transferred to
adult court at younger ages for a broader variety of crimes." Id at 1564. There is now a
broad range of crimes that, if committed, will cause the juvenile to be tried in adult court.
Scott & Grisso, supra note 36, at 149-50.
62. Fritsch & Hemmens, supra note 24, at 572 (stating that juveniles who are fourteen-
years-old and fifteen-years-old may now be waived to adult court in a majority of states); see,
e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62B.390
(2003).
63. JOHN WHITEHEAD & STEVEN LAB, JUVENILE JUSTICE 218 (4th ed. 2004).
64. Brink, supra note 20, at 1555.
65. LYNN CoTHERN, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILES AND THE DEATH PENALTY (Nov. 2000), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/ html/ojjdp/coordcouncil/cc_02.html.
66. As of March 2005, the following states allowed the death penalty for offenders un-
der eighteen-years-old: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 app. A, at 579 (2005).
67. See Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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B. History of the Court's Eighth Amendment Analysis, the Juvenile
Death Penalty, and Important Eighth Amendment Cases
1. History and Evolution of the Court's Analysis of Eighth
Amendment Cases
To understand how the Supreme Court analyzes death penalty
cases today, it is necessary to understand the evolution of the Court's
framework for Eighth Amendment analysis. 68 Over the years, dissen-
tion has been prevalent among the Justices as to what is the appropri-
ate manner to analyze an Eighth Amendment case.69
In 1958, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court crafted a defined framework
for deciding whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.7 °
Chief Justice Warren, writing the opinion for the Court, stated the
standard: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. 71
The term "evolving standards of decency" has become a standard
cited in almost every subsequent Eighth Amendment case as a basis
and starting point for Eighth Amendment analysis.7 z
In 1976, the Court established, in Gregg v. Georgia, the proper
factors to consider when determining what the evolving standards of
decency are in American society.73 The Gregg Court considered two
specific objective indicia: actions of legislatures and actions of ju-
ries.74 Yet the Court also found it proper to use its own judgment to
determine if the sentence imposed was proportional to the crime
committed.75 In death penalty cases following Gregg, the Court has
68. The text of the Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
69. See ADAM ORTIz, AM. BAR ASs'N, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY: EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 1 (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/EvolvingStandards.pdf.
70. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958). Trop was convicted of desertion during
World War 1H. Id. at 88. As a result, he lost his citizenship under the provisions of the Na-
tionality Act of 1940. Id. The Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids Congress to
punish by taking away citizenship." Id. at 103.
71. Id. at 101.
72. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
73. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179, 181.
74. Id. Writing for a plurality, Justice Stewart stressed the importance of looking at
"objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction" to avoid deciding
cases subjectively. Id. at 173.
75. The Court concluded that looking to objective indicia alone is not sufficient in con-
ducting a complete Eighth Amendment analysis. Id. The Court must also consider whether,
295
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routinely used its own independent judgment, in varying degrees, to
support its holdings.76
Although it appears the Court established clear guidelines for ana-
lyzing death penalty cases, a widely accepted standard is still lacking
for determining what the evolving standards of decency are in the
United States.77 Between 1982 and 2005, the Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty four separate
times.78 In these four cases, the Court recognized that its analysis was
governed by the evolving standards of decency; however, its analysis
of this standard encompassed different factors and employed differing
philosophies.79
2. Recent Juvenile Death Penalty Cases
a. Eddings v. Oklahoma
In 1982, the Supreme Court heard one of its first juvenile death
penalty cases, Eddings v. Oklahoma.80  The Court did not decide
whether the death penalty was a constitutional punishment for Ed-
dings, who was sixteen years old at the time of his crime.81 Instead,
the Court overturned his death sentence because the lower court did
not consider certain mitigating factors that might have influenced the
first, the punishment serves the two penological goals of retribution and deterrence and, sec-
ond, whether the punishment is proportional to the crime. Id. at 183, 187; see also Charles S.
Doskow, The Juvenile Death Penalty: The Beat Goes on, 24 J. Juv. L. 45, 47 (2004).
76. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("These recent events evi-
dencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this
controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment.").
77. "Although there is agreement that the Court must consider objective factors, the Jus-
tices disagree as to what degree of these factors indicates a consensus (e.g., What is an appro-
priate number of states? Death convictions? Executions?) and how a balance is struck be-
tween these measurable indicia and the Court's judgment." ORTiz, supra note 69, at 1.
78. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982).
79. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61 (considering "objective indicia of consensus, as ex-
pressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures" and then turning to "our own inde-
pendent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles");
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (applying "objective factors: such as "con-
temporary values [evinced by] . . . the country's legislatures"); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369
(looking to "those [standards] of modern American society as a whole); Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 821 (stating that deciding what are the current "standards of decency" required reviewing
"the work product of state legislatures and sentencing juries").
80. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104.
81. Id. at 105, 110 n.5.
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judge to impose a lesser sentence.8 2 According to the Court, a judge
must appropriately weigh mitigating factors such as age, emotional
development, and family background before deciding whether or not
to sentence a juvenile to death.83 Importantly, the Eddings Court rec-
ognized that the defendant's chronological age should serve as a
weighty mitigating factor, along with a bad family history and any
psychological or learning impairment. 8
b. Thompson v. Oklahoma
In 1988, the Court heard another juvenile death penalty case,
Thompson v. Oklahoma.8" Unlike in Eddings, the Court addressed
whether it is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment to sentence a
fifteen-year-old to death.86  Along with three others, fifteen-year-old
William Wayne Thompson murdered his brother-in-law in January
1983.87 After committing the murder, Thompson admitted shooting
his brother-in-law in the head, cutting his throat, and throwing his
body into the river.88 Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to death.89
The Court, after considering Thompson's case, ruled for the first
time that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to sentence to
death any person under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime. 90
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, first looked to objective factors
such as legislative action and jury sentences to determine the evolving
standards of decency in American society.91 The Court found that
states were considerably split over the minimum age a juvenile must
be to receive the death penalty. 92
82. Id. at 114-15; see also Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juve-
niles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 236 (1989).
83. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116.
84. Id. ("[T]he chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great
weight .. "); Cothern, supra note 65 ("Eddings was important, however, because the Court
held that the chronological age of a minor is a relevant mitigating factor that must be consid-
ered at sentencing.").
85. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
86. Id. at 818-19.
87. Id. at 819.
88. Id. at 860-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 818 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 838.
91. Id. at 821-23.
92. Nineteen states with the death penalty set no minimum age requirement; eighteen
states with the death penalty had statutorily set the age limit at sixteen-years-old, seventeen-
years-old, or eighteen-years-old; and thirteen states, plus the District of Columbia, did not
statutorily allow the death penalty. Id. at 826-27 n.25, 829 n.30.
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When the Court looked to jury determinations, the second objec-
tive indicium of the evolving standards of decency, it found the last
execution of an offender under the age of sixteen occurred in 1948. 9'
Based on these facts, the Court determined that "the imposition of the
death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to
the conscience of the community."'94
The Court did not rest its final determination solely on the actions
of state legislatures and juries. Stating that it is ultimately for the trial
court to decide whether the punishment of death is proportional to the
personal culpability of a fifteen-year-old,9" the Court then provided
lengthy commentary on how juveniles, as a class, are less culpable
than adults. 96 The Court found that juveniles as a class are "less ma-
ture and responsible than adults[,] ... less able to evaluate the conse-
quences of [their] conduct[, and] more apt to be motivated by mere
emotion or peer pressure. ' 97 Therefore, any crime a juvenile commits
cannot be as "morally reprehensible as that of an adult."98 Thus, the
Court held that inflicting capital punishment on anyone under sixteen-
years-old at the time of the offense is cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.99
In his dissent, Justice Scalia disagreed with both the plurality's
Eighth Amendment analysis and its conclusion."°° Justice Scalia's
main concern was with the Court's use of its own independent judg-
ment. 10 1 He stressed the importance of looking primarily to objective
factors, such as the actions of legislatures and sentencing juries, to
avoid making wholly subjective judgments."° Interestingly, one year
later, Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion for the next juvenile
93. Id. at 831-32.
94. Id. at 832.
95. Id. at 833. To justify the Court's position that its own judgment may be used in de-
termining if the death sentence is proportional to the defendant's personal culpability, the
Court referenced Coker, in which the Court stated, "[T]he Constitution contemplates that in
the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 823 n.8 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
96. See, e.g., id. at 835.
97. Id. at 834-35.
98. Id. at 835.
99. Id. at 838.
100. Id. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 873 ("On its face, the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishments' limits the
evolving standards appropriate for our consideration to those entertained by the society rather
than those dictated by our personal consciences.").
102. Id. at 865; see also id. at 873 (criticizing the majority for going beyond such con-
siderations).
[Vol. 42298
12
California Western Law Review, Vol. 42 [2005], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol42/iss2/5
2006] JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY AND ROPER v. SIMMONS 299
death penalty case heard by the Court, which upheld the death penalty
for sixteen-year-old and seventeen-year-old defendants. 03
c. Stanford v. Kentucky
In 1989, the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky decided whether it is
cruel and unusual punishment to sentence anyone to death who was
sixteen-years-old or seventeen-years-old at the time of the crime.104
Kevin Stanford was seventeen-years-old when he and an accomplice
went to a gas station to commit a robbery. 5 While there, the two
boys repeatedly raped and sodomized the gas station attendant,
twenty-year-old Barbel Poore.1" They drove her to a remote area
where Stanford shot her in the face and the back of the head."0 7 Stan-
ford was convicted of first-degree murder. 0 8
In the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia looked primarily at objec-
tive factors to determine society's standards, without giving weight to
any subjective viewpoints. 1 9 First, Justice Scalia considered existing
state statutes regarding the age at which a juvenile may be sentenced
to death. 0 Once again, the states were widely split as to whether they
allowed sixteen-year-old and seventeen-year-old defendants to receive
the death penalty."1 ' Due to the wide variety of opinions expressed by
the nation's elected officials, Justice Scalia concluded that the peti-
tioners "d[id] not establish the degree of national consensus this Court
has previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel
and unusual."'"2 Justice Scalia then considered the number of sixteen-
103. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
104. Id. at 364-65.
105. Id. at 365.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 366-67.
109. Id. at 364, 369. "In determining what standards have 'evolved,' however, we have
looked not to our own conceptions of decency, but to those of modem American society as a
whole." Id. at 369. The plurality in Stanford analyzed this Eighth Amendment case in the
way urged by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Thompson. Compare id. at 378-79,
with Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859-78 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
111. Thirteen states did not allow for the death penalty at all; therefore, the practices of
the remaining thirty-seven death penalty states were relevant for Justice Scalia's analysis. See
id. at 370 & n.2. Of those thirty-seven states, twelve set the minimum age for the death pen-
alty at eighteen-years-old, three set the minimum age at seventeen-years-old, and twenty-two
states allowed the death penalty for individuals under seventeen-years-old. Id. Of those
twenty-two states, nineteen set no specific age limit in their statutes and three set the age limit
at sixteen-years-old. See id. at 370, 371 n.3.
112. Id. at 370-71. To highlight what Justice Scalia meant by "the degree of national
consensus ... previously thought sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and un-
usual," he pointed to the Court's previous decisions in cases such as Coker. Id. at 371. For
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year-old and seventeen-year-old defendants sentenced to death by ju-
ries nationwide." 3 Justice Scalia acknowledged that, historically, far
fewer juveniles have been sentenced to death than adults. 114 Yet Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out this trend could be due to the fact that "a far
smaller percentage of capital crimes are committed by persons under
18 than over 18."115
Justice Scalia did not analyze whether the punishment of death
was proportional to the defendant's culpability or whether the decision
was in line with international opinion. 116 Further, the plurality opinion
did not consider scientific research regarding the culpability of six-
teen-year-old and seventeen-year-old defendants.' The plurality held
that the Court was obligated to analyze Eighth Amendment cases ac-
cording to the evolving standards of decency." 8 However, according
to Justice Scalia, that did not mean the Court may use its own per-
sonal, subjective beliefs to reach a decision. "' Therefore, based on
the lack of national consensus against imposing the death penalty on
those who are sixteen-years-old or seventeen-years-old at the time of
the crime, the plurality concluded that this practice was constitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. 120
The Court did not hear another juvenile death penalty case until
Roper v. Simmons in 2005.121 However, an influential Eighth
Amendment case concerning the death penalty and mentally retarded
offenders set the stage for the Court to take another look at the juve-
nile death penalty. 21
example, in Coker, only one state allowed the death penalty for the crime of rape. Id; see also
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977). This comparison shows the stark contrast
between what consisted of a national consensus in other cases as opposed to the widespread
differences in juvenile death penalty statutes at the time of Stanford.
113. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 374.
116. Id. at 369 n.l, 379.
117. Id. at 378 ("The battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth Amendment;
and in that struggle socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific evidence is not
an available weapon.").
118. Id. at 379 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Scalia said, "Our job
is to identify the 'evolving standards of decency'; to determine, not what they should be, but
what they are." Id. at 378.
119. Id. at 378-79.
120. Id. at 380.
121. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005).
122. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07 (2002).
300 [Vol. 42
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3. Atkins v. Virginia-A Launching Pad for Roper
In the 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia, the Court addressed the is-
sue of whether it is constitutional to impose the death sentence on a
mentally retarded offender. 23 Justice Stevens, writing the opinion for
the Court, first looked to state statutes and jury practices to determine
the current evolving standards of decency. 24 The Court found that
eighteen death penalty states forbade executing mentally retarded of-
fenders. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, noted that twelve states did not
allow the death penalty under any circumstances.1 25 Thus, thirty states
opposed the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders. Even
though the numbers did not represent an overwhelming majority, the
Court stated that "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change" because
sixteen states had passed statutes forbidding the practice in just eleven
years. 126 The majority opinion also asserted that a national consensus
formed against the practice because only five states had executed
mentally retarded offenders in the last sixteen years. 127
In addition, the Court recognized many other factors supporting
its conclusion, including the views of professional organizations, reli-
gious organizations, the international community, as well as nation-
wide public opinion polls. 28 The Court concluded that the death pen-
alty was not appropriate because of a mentally retarded offender's
lessened culpability. 29  This evidence, coupled with a national con-
sensus against the practice, led the Court to conclude that it is uncon-
stitutional to sentence a mentally retarded offender to death. 30
After the Court's decision in Atkins, many throughout the legal
and professional community speculated that the same rationale used
by the Court to exclude mentally retarded offenders from the death
123. Id. at 307. Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of capital murder, abduction, and
armed robbery. Id. at 307. Atkins and his accomplice abducted Eric Nesbitt, robbed him,
took him to a remote location, and killed him by shooting him eight times. Id. Although a
psychologist testified during the penalty phase of the trial that Atkins suffered from mild men-
tal retardation and had an IQ of fifty-nine, the jury sentenced Atkins to death for his crime.
Id. at 308-10. An IQ score between seventy and seventy-five is "typically considered the cut-
off IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition." Id. at
309 n.5.
124. Id. at 306, 311-16.
125. See id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 314-15 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 316.
128. Id. at 316 n.21.
129. Id. at 319.
130. Id. at 321.
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penalty would soon be used to exclude all juvenile offenders as
well. 3' Numerous law review articles advocated the end of the juve-
nile death penalty, arguing that the culpability of the mentally retarded
and juveniles was essentially the same.'32 Also, many professional or-
ganizations began to solidify their stance and became more vocal
against the juvenile death penalty, knowing the Atkins decision gave
their arguments more credibility.'33
In 2003, Christopher Simmons, a defendant on death row for
committing a crime at age seventeen, filed a petition for state post-
conviction relief with the Missouri Supreme Court based on the prem-
ise that his sentence was unconstitutional after the Court's recent deci-
sion in Atkins.'4 Although the Missouri Supreme Court upheld Sim-
mons' death sentence in 1997, it considered his case again and agreed
that his sentence should be reversed on the basis of the rationale in At-
kins.135 The State of Missouri appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court,
and the Court granted certiorari. 3 6  By agreeing to hear Simmons'
131. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Ration-
ales for a Categorical Exemption for Juveniles from Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REv.
207, 207 (2003) ("The Atkins decision, though welcomed by both popular and legal policy
audiences, naturally raises the question: what about juveniles?"); Audra M. Bogdanski,
Comment, Relying on Atkins v. Virginia as Precedent to Find the Juvenile Death Penalty
Unconstitutional: Perpetuating Bad Precedent?, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 603, 603 (2004) (stating
that after Atkins, "there is ... reason to believe that the Court will soon revisit the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile death penalty"); Robin M. A. Weeks, Note, Comparing Children to
the Mentally Retarded: How the Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of
Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 451, 451 (2003) (stating that the decision in Atkins
"could soon lead to the exclusion of all juveniles from death penalty eligibility").
132. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 131, at 253 ("Extending the Court's Atkins reasoning
to sentencing determinations for juveniles not only maintains the integrity of the Court's At-
kins decision, it more importantly reduces the risk of executing children who are less than
fully culpable for their crimes."); Richard Heisler, The Kids Are Alright: Roper v. Simmons
and the Juvenile Death Penalty After Atkins v. Virginia, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 25, 64-64 (2004)
(predicting that the Court would rule the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional due to the
growing evidence that the mentally retarded and juveniles have similar psychological and
emotional traits).
133. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Ass'n in Support of the Re-
spondent at 10-11, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399;
Michael G. Kelley, Comment, Why Should We Treat All Teen Offenders as Though They Are
Mentally Retarded? An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Executing People Who Committed
Their Crimes While They Were Either Sixteen or Seventeen Years Old, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1501,
1526-27 (2004) (criticizing the views promoting a reconsideration of the juvenile death pen-
alty and noting that "[a]dvocates of banning all teen offender executions claim that the mental
retardation cases have opened the door for the United States Supreme Court to hold that exe-
cuting teen offenders violates evolving standards of decency and, therefore, violates the
Eighth Amendment.").
134. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559; State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399
(Mo. 2003).
135. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559-60.
136. Id. at 560.
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case, the Court considered the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty for the first time in sixteen years. 13
7
III. ROPER v. SIMMONS
A. Details of the Crime
Seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons told his friends he
wanted to murder someone, and he devised a plan regarding the best
way to do so. 138  Simmons broke into the home of Shirley Crook
around two o'clock a.m.139 He forced Ms. Crook to the floor, bound
her hands with duct tape, and put tape over her eyes and mouth.4 He
and his friends drove her, in her own minivan, to a state park and
parked near a railroad trestle that spanned a large river.' 4' At this
point, the boys noticed that Ms. Crook had managed to remove some
of the tape from her face, so they used her purse strap, bathrobe belt,
and some electrical wire to further bind her hands and feet together. 142
After forcing her onto the railroad trestle, Simmons wrapped Ms.
Crook's head entirely with duct tape and hog-tied her feet together be-
fore pushing her to her death in the river below.'43
After Simmons was arrested, he voluntarily confessed to the mur-
der.'" Simmons was tried as an adult and convicted of burglary, kid-
napping, stealing, and first-degree murder. 145 At the sentencing phase
of the trial, the Court instructed the jury to consider Simmons' age as
a mitigating factor, and Simmons ultimately received the death pen-
alty. 146
B. Majority Opinion
1. Eighth Amendment Analytical Framework
In Roper, the Court again faced the issue of whether sentencing a
seventeen-year-old defendant to death conforms with the evolving
137. Id. at 555.
138. Id. at 556; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 3.
139. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 3-4.
140. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4.
141. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556-57; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4.
142. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4.
143. Id.; Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
144. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 5.
145. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
146. Id. at 558.
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standards of decency and is, thus, constitutional. 147  In the plurality
opinion, Justice Kennedy stated the issue would be determined by first
looking to objective factors, such as state legislatures and jury deter-
minations, and then by looking at the Court's own independent judg-
ment. 48 Justice Kennedy essentially rejected the Stanford Court's
analytical framework to determine the evolving standards of decency
and adopted the analysis used in Atkins, which relied on the Court's
independent judgment. 149
2. National Consensus
To begin its analysis, the Court looked for a national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty by looking to state legislative en-
actments and the actions of sentencing juries. 50 Twelve states did not
allow the death penalty under any circumstance, and eighteen states
that allowed the death penalty had statutorily or judicially made indi-
viduals under eighteen-years-old ineligible for the death penalty.' 5 '
According to the Court's calculations, thirty states opposed to the
death penalty for juveniles equaled the number of states in Atkins op-
posed to the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders-a number
deemed sufficient to show a national consensus against the practice.15 2
Additionally, Justice Kennedy noted that the states allowing the
death penalty for sixteen-year-old and seventeen-year-old defendants
rarely sentenced those offenders to death.'53
[T]he objective indicia of consensus in this case . . . ; the infre-
quency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the con-
sistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice-provide suf-
ficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words
Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as "categorically less
culpable than the average criminal. 154
147. Id. at 555-56, 560-61. The Court already ruled the death sentence unconstitutional
for anyone under the age of sixteen in Thompson; therefore, in Roper, the Court considered
exactly the same issue it had in Stanford. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-19
(1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
148. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554, 564.
149. See id. at 562-64. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's opinion in
Stanford, agreeing that the Court should only look to objective factors to determine the evolv-
ing standards of decency. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364, 377-79.
150. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65.
151. Id. at 564.
152. Id.
153. Id. Since Stanford, only six states had executed an offender who was either six-
teen-years-old or seventeen-years-old when the offense occurred. Id.
154. Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
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3. Proportionality Analysis
After establishing that a national consensus existed against the ju-
venile death penalty, Justice Kennedy engaged in a proportionality
analysis. 15 5  The Court used its independent judgment to determine
whether the imposed punishment is proportional to the defendant's
culpability. 156
The Court pointed to three main differences between juveniles
and adults to illustrate why imposing the death sentence on juveniles
is a disproportionate punishment.157 First, juveniles are less mature
and less responsible than adults, causing juveniles to be reckless, im-
petuous, and poor decision-makers. 158 Second, juveniles succumb to
peer pressure and other negative influences because they are less able
to control their environment.15 9 Finally, because they are still growing
and changing, the personality traits of a juvenile are not permanent.160
To support these three suppositions, the Court relied on scientific and
sociological studies, 161 amici briefs filed with the Court that confirm
those studies, 162 psychological journals, 163 and state statutes preventing
juveniles from voting, drinking, or marrying without parental con-
sent."6 Thus, the Court's proportionality analysis was aided by scien-
tific research and the views of respected organizations, which
strengthened the Court's resolve to exclude sixteen-year-old and sev-
enteen-year-old defendants from the death penalty.
155. Id. at 571-73.
156. Id. "Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on
one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished .... " Id. at 571.
157. Id. at 569. "Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evi-
dent that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force
than to adults." Id at 571.
158. Id. at 569.
159. Id. "Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to es-
cape negative influences in their whole environment." Id. at 570.
160. Id. "[A] greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be re-
formed." Id.
161. Id. at 565-66.
162. See, e.g., id. at 569; Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n, & the Missouri
Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No.
03-633), 2004 WL 1636447 [hereinafter Brief for the APA in Roper] ("Developmentally im-
mature decision-making, paralleled by immature neurological development, diminishes an
adolescent's blameworthiness.").
163. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
164. Id. (stating that these statutes illustrate that each state recognizes the immaturity
and irresponsibility of juveniles).
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4. International Opinion
As a final factor in the Court's analysis, Justice Kennedy ad-
dressed the views of the international community against the juvenile
death penalty. 165 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the United States is
one of the only countries in the world to allow the death penalty for
offenders under the age of eighteen." He mentioned that "only seven
countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offend-
ers since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the De-
mocratic Republic of Congo, and China." 167 Also, the United States
and Somalia are the only two United Nation Member countries not to
have ratified Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which has a provision prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders
under age eighteen. 68 Although Justice Kennedy stated that these
facts are not controlling and "the task of interpreting the Eighth
Amendment remains [the Court's] responsibility," he stated "[i]t is
proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty." 69 He concluded that in-
ternational opinion "provide[s] respected and significant confirma-
tion" for the Court's conclusion that it is unconstitutional to impose
the death sentence on an offender who is sixteen-years-old or seven-
teen-years-old at the time of the crime. 170
5. The Court's Conclusion
The Court concluded that Simmons' death sentence was unconsti-
tutional because it was a cruel and unusual punishment according to
the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 171 The Court
found a current national consensus against executing juveniles be-
cause eighteen death penalty states set the minimum age for the death
penalty at eighteen-years-old. 172 Additionally, the Court relied on sci-
entific research, organizational views, and international opinion.'73
Although the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis did not mirror the
165. Id. at 575-78.
166. Id. at 575.
167. Id. at 577.
168. Id. at 576.
169. Id. at 575, 578.
170. Id. at 578.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 564.
173. Id. at 569-78.
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analysis in Stanford, the Court's ruling effectively overruled Stanford
and set a new standard for state legislatures to follow. 74
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's holding for two
main reasons.175 First, she disagreed that a national consensus existed
against imposing capital punishment on sixteen-year-old or seventeen-
year-old defendants. 76  Justice O'Connor agreed the plurality cor-
rectly looked at objective factors, such as legislatures and juries, yet
based on these factors she disagreed that a national consensus had
formed. 77
Second, she believed the plurality's proportionality analysis did
not logically lead to its final conclusion. 178 Instead, Justice O'Connor
accused the plurality of using its own "independent moral judgment"
rather than relying on objective indicators to determine whether the
death sentence was proportional to the culpability of a juvenile of-
fender. 179  Justice O'Connor remarked, "[T]he proportionality argu-
ment against the juvenile death penalty is so flawed that it can be
given little, if any, analytical weight." 80 Rather than agreeing with
the plurality's sweeping conclusions that all juveniles are immature,
irresponsible, and unable to control their impulses, Justice O'Connor
rejected the plurality's findings that juveniles possess these character-
istics. '8 Justice O'Connor argued that while it is true juveniles are
generally less mature and responsible, some sixteen-year-olds and
seventeen-year-olds may be sufficiently culpable to be punished as
adults.'82 According to Justice O'Connor, Christopher Simmons was
174. Id. at 575 ("Stanford should no longer control in those few pending cases or in
those yet to arise.").
175. Id. at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 588 ("[T]he evidence before us fails to demonstrate conclusively that any
such consensus has emerged in the brief period since we upheld the constitutionality of this
practice in Stanford ... ").
177. Id. at 589-93.
178. Id. at 588.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 598.
181. Id. at 599-601. Justice O'Connor believed that categorizing all juveniles together
created a class that was "too broad and too diverse to warrant a categorical prohibition." Id.
at 601. She also predicted that by drawing an age-based line for death penalty eligibility, the
Court created a line that will "quite likely... protect a number of offenders who are mature
enough to deserve the death penalty." Id. at 601-02.
182. Id. at 599 ("The fact that juveniles are generally less culpable for their misconduct
than adults does not necessarily mean that a 17-year-old murderer cannot be sufficiently cul-
pable to merit the death penalty.").
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such a juvenile because he premeditated and planned his crime and
carried it out in such a cruel and calculated fashion. 18 3
D. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia also dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas.' Justice Scalia described how a national con-
sensus had not formed against the juvenile death penalty since Stan-
ford and expressed disdain for the plurality's use of its own independ-
ent judgment. 85
Although the plurality concluded there was a national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty, Justice Scalia refuted this position
by pointing out only forty-seven percent of death penalty states actu-
ally forbade imposing capital punishment on sixteen-year-old or sev-
enteen-year-old defendants.'86 Also, Justice Scalia believed that rely-
ing on this "subtle shift in numbers" was short-sighted because states
frequently change their statutes regarding the death penalty. 87  Fur-
thermore, by deciding this case, the Court had taken the issue entirely
away from state legislatures, preventing them from deciding what is
best for their own people. 88
Justice Scalia was primarily concerned with the plurality using its
own judgment, rather than determining society's evolving standards of
decency according to the actions of legislatures and juries. 89 Justice
Scalia accused the plurality of "picking and choosing" whichever so-
ciological and psychological studies best supported its position, in-
stead of relying on "methodologically sound" studies."9 Justice Scalia
reiterated the view he expressed numerous times in prior death penalty
cases (such as Thompson and Stanford) that legislatures and juries are
the only trustworthy indicators of the country's moral compass.' 9'
183. Id. at 600.
184. Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 608.
186. Id. at 609. Scalia pointed out that in the Court's previous Eighth Amendment
cases, the Court required an "overwhelming opposition to a challenged practice, generally
over a long period of time." Id.
187. Id. at 612.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 615-16. According to Scalia, legislatures are more qualified to weigh com-
peting scientific studies and study the results to make an appropriate decision. Id. at 618.
Also, juries maintain an important link with the community and should be trusted to make
appropriate sentencing determinations. Id. at 616, 620.
190. Id. at 617.
191. Id. at 615-16; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308 [Vol. 42
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 42 [2005], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol42/iss2/5
2006] JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY AND ROPER v. SIMMONS
Justice Scalia's final disagreement with the plurality's decision
stemmed from its heavy reliance on international views and opin-
ions. 192  According to Justice Scalia, the views of foreign nations
should have no bearing on the decisions of the Supreme Court. 9 3 Jus-
tice Scalia specifically addressed the plurality's contention that the
United States is out of line with the world community because it has
not ratified Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 194
He pointed out that Article 37 also prohibits sentencing juveniles to
life in prison without possibility of parole-a sentence that is still pos-
sible for juvenile offenders in the United States.195 Justice Scalia
therefore rejected using international opinion and accused the plurality
of using foreign views only to further its "own notion of how the
world ought to be.' 9 6
IV. ANALYSIS OF ROPER AND ITS FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS
A. Holding Based on Inconclusive or Irrelevant Evidence
1. Lack of a National Consensus
When Roper was decided, there was not an overwhelming na-
tional consensus against the juvenile death penalty to conclusively
hold it is a cruel and unusual punishment. Twelve states did not allow
the death penalty under any circumstances; therefore, they should not
have been relevant to any discussion concerning the juvenile death
penalty. 197 Of the remaining thirty-eight states that support the death
penalty, only eighteen set the minimum age limit for imposing the
death penalty at eighteen-years-old. 98 The other twenty death penalty
192. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 623-24.
194. Id. at 622-23.
195. Id. at 623.
196. Id. at 628. To sum up his position, Scalia remarked, "I do not believe that the
meaning of our Eighth Amendment ... should be determined by the subjective views of five
Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners." Id. at 608.
197. See id. at 564 (majority opinion). These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Id. app. A, at 579. Justice Scalia has consistently stated that states that do not
allow the death penalty have no place in determining whether there is a national consensus
against imposing the death penalty on a certain class. See, e.g., id. at 610-11 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 n.2 (1989).
198. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. app. A, at 579.
309
23
Rowe: Mourning the Untimely Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty: An Exa
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2005
310 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
states either set the minimum age at sixteen-years-old, seventeen-
years-old, or they did not have an express minimum age. 199 Therefore,
fifty-three percent of death penalty states reserved the right to impose
the death penalty on a deserving juvenile offender.
The weak consensus among states led Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas to rightly ponder how the plu-
rality could find a national consensus against the juvenile death pen-
alty. Justice O'Connor recognized that "so little has changed since
[the] recent decision in Stanford,"2°° and Scalia concluded that
"[w]ords have no meaning if the views of less than 50% of death pen-
alty States can constitute a national consensus."201
The decision is also alarming because Roper was decided only
sixteen years after Stanford. Rather than allowing state legislatures
time to fully address the issue and conduct studies concerning the ju-
venile death penalty, the Court "pre-empt[ed] the democratic debate
through which genuine consensus might develop.
20 2
The Court in Roper also looked at the frequency of sentencing ju-
venile offenders to death.20 3 After determining that the practice was
infrequent, 21 the Court concluded that states should not have the abil-
ity to ask jurors to decide whether a juvenile offender deserves the
death penalty because juries are incapable of properly considering a
juvenile's age and emotional maturity as mitigating factors.20 5
These statements, coupled with the Court's final holding in Roper,
eliminated the important discretion and judgment of juries in capital
cases. In Eddings, the Court established that a defendant's age must
be considered as a mitigating factor, and a juvenile's fate should be
decided on an individual, case-by-case basis. 206  After Roper, indi-
199. Id. at 564, app. A, at 579. The states that set the minimum age at seventeen-years-
old are New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Texas. Id. The states that set the minimum age
at sixteen-years-old are Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, and Virginia. Id. The states that set no
minimum age requirement are bound by the Court's decision in Thompson, therefore they
cannot impose the death penalty on anyone who was under sixteen-years-old at the time of the
crime. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Utah. Id app. A, at
579.
200. Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 609 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 606 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 564-65 (majority opinion).
204. Id. at 564.
205. Id. at 572-73.
206. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982).
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vidualized considerations are no longer a factor-the Court concluded
that it is unlikely that any crime committed by a juvenile could ever
overpower the mitigating effect of age.2 7 By taking these sentencing
decisions out of a jury's hands, the Court implicitly doubted American
citizens' ability to weigh a body of evidence and recommend an ap-
propriate sentence for a sixteen-year-old or seventeen-year-old defen-
dant who kills in cold blood.2 °8
The Court's conclusions regarding the actions of both legislatures
and juries offend two of the country's core political institutions.2" In
the past, the Court repeatedly recognized the importance of deferring
to state legislatures and juries in Eighth Amendment cases.210 Justice
Scalia recognized the tension the Court created between the judiciary
and legislative branches and concluded that "[t]oday's opinion pro-
vides a perfect example of why judges are ill-equipped to make the
type of legislative judgments the Court insists on making here. 211
Rather than allowing state legislatures to determine whether the juve-
nile death penalty is appropriate for their state, the Court eliminated
their power to appropriately legislate according to the best interests of
their constituents. 21 2 The Court also insulted the capabilities of juries
by eliminating their ability to assess the culpability of juvenile offend-
ers on an individualized basis. Even more troubling is that these func-
tions were taken away based on a national consensus against the juve-
nile death penalty-a finding that is arguably too weak to actually
exist.21 3
207. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573-74.
208. Id. at 573.
209. See id. at 620 (Scalia. J.. dissentina) ("This startling conclusion undermines the
very foundations of our capital sentencing system ....").
210. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Courts are not representative bodies.
They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.... History teaches that
the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts ... assume primary responsibil-
ity in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures."); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910) ("The function of the legislature is primary, its exer-
cise fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor
by any judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety.").
211. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 612, 616.
213. See id.
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2. Use of the Court's Own Independent Judgment
To justify its holding that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitu-
tional, the Court announced that its "own judgment will be brought to
bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment" 24 and "whether the death penalty is a dispropor-
tionate punishment for juveniles."2 5 The Justices have historically
split on whether using independent judgment serves a proper function
in the Court's Eighth Amendment analysis.216 Regardless of whether
it is proper to use independent judgment in an Eighth Amendment
case, the Roper Court's independent proportionality analysis was con-
trived and inconclusive.
The Court justified its judgment by making sweeping conclusions
regarding the capability and maturity of all juveniles 2 7 -a considera-
bly large class of individuals in this country. Basing its conclusions
on relevant scientific studies, the Court concluded that all juveniles
are immature, irresponsible, incapable of controlling their environ-
ment, and susceptible to peer pressure. 218 At issue in Roper was the
culpability of a seventeen-year old offender, yet the Court relied on
scientific research about juveniles in general. The Court never ade-
quately defined the term juvenile or clarified that it referred to the cul-
pability of sixteen-year-old or seventeen-year-old defendants specifi-
cally. The Court also did not recognize that there could be a distinct
or measurable difference between the culpability of a seventeen-year-
old defendant and, for example, a fourteen-year-old defendant. In-
stead, the Court generally concluded that "the logic of Thompson ex-
tends to those who are under 18. "219
The Court relied heavily on scientific research presented by many
respected organizations who filed amici briefs in support of Sim-
mons-research that supported the Court's own independent judgment
214. Id. at 563-64 (majority opinion) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597
(1977)). It is also interesting to note that the Court acknowledges relying on Atkins for its
framework for analysis and not Stanford, even though Stanford represented the prevailing
consensus on the juvenile death penalty at the time of Roper. See id at 563-64.
215. Id.
216. Compare, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (Justice Scalia re-
jecting the idea that the Court should use its own informed judgment), with Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (Justice Stevens advocating that the Court's own judgment should
be employed in Eighth Amendment cases).
217. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-72.
218. Id. at 569-70.
219. Id. at 574.
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that the death penalty is never appropriate for juveniles.22 ° For exam-
ple, the Court seems to have adopted many of the arguments made by
the American Psychological Association (APA) in an amicus brief
filed in Roper.221 In this brief, the APA contended that juveniles are
immature decision-makers, have immature judgment, and are not yet
neurologically developed.222 Yet in a brief filed by the APA in Hodg-
son v. Minnesota,223 the organization claimed that "by age 14 most
adolescents have developed adult-like intellectual and social capaci-
ties" and "[r]esearch in social and personality development contradicts
the stereotype of adolescence as a period when young people are para-
lyzed by a struggle for identity, social confusion, and rebellion. '224
This conflicting testimony illustrates that studies regarding juveniles
are continually fluctuating, changing, and subject to different interpre-
tations. Therefore, Justice Scalia was justified in declaring, "all the
Court has done today.., is to look over the heads of the crowd and
pick out its friends. 225
The Court's proportionality analysis is also flawed because it lik-
ened the culpability of juveniles to the lesser culpability of the men-
tally retarded.226 Juveniles, as a class, are not defined by specific im-
pairments or genetic defects.227 Mentally retarded offenders all share
common characteristics that separate them from the general popula-
tion, whereas juveniles are defined by a chronological age. Every liv-
220. See, e.g., Brief for the APA in Roper, supra note 162, at 2; Brief of the American
Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-
633), 2004 WL 1633549; Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Ass'n in Support of the
Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1617399; Brief for the Coalition
for Juvenile Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No.
03-633), 2004 WL 1628522; Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1660637.
221. The Court's plurality opinion in Roper reflects many of the same findings included
in the APA's amicus brief. Compare Brief for the APA in Roper, supra note 162, at 2-3, with
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
222. Brief for the APA in Roper, supra note 162, at 2.
223. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
224. Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Ass'n et al. in Support of Petition-
ers/Cross-Respondents in Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309 and in Support of Appellees in No. 88-805,
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-1125 & 88-1309), 1989 WL 1127529.
The APA in this case argued in support of pregnant minors, claiming they have sufficient de-
cision-making and reasoning skills to decide whether or not to have an abortion and did not
need to notify their parents. Id.
225. Roper, 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 567 (majority opinion) ("[T]oday our society views juveniles, in the words
Atkins used respecting the mentally retarded, as 'categorically less culpable than the average
criminal."' (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002))).
227. See Hoffmann, supra note 82, at 274 ("In the juvenile death penalty context,
chronological age is not the very characteristic that renders the death penalty necessarily in-
appropriate, in retributive terms, for the entire class of relevant defendants.").
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ing adult on earth today has been within this class for eighteen years
of his or her life. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that within the
class of juveniles in this country, maturity levels and reasoning skills
can differ considerably. 228 As Justice O'Connor concluded in her dis-
senting opinion, "at least some 17-year-old murderers are sufficiently
mature to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case. 212 9  Yet,
the Court made a sweeping conclusion that no juvenile can ever have
the requisite moral culpability to deserve the death penalty.230
The Court in Roper should have considered Simmons' own level
of emotional maturity, his intelligence, and the chilling facts surround-
ing the murder of Shirley Crook to decide whether the death penalty
was an appropriate punishment.23' Instead, the Court used Simmons'
case to unnecessarily create an age-based categorical rule exempting
all minors from the death penalty. 2 2 As a result, any sixteen-year-old
or seventeen-year-old defendant who commits a crime as horrific and
devastating as Simmons will escape the ultimate punishment, no mat-
ter how emotionally mature or responsible.
3. International Opinion
One of the most prominent influences on the Court in Roper was
the overwhelming pressure of the international community to ban the
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. The European
Union, former U.S. diplomats, former world leaders, and Nobel Peace
Prize recipients all submitted amici briefs with the Court in support of
228. See id. at 275 ("[N]ot all juveniles fit the model of the immature, easily influenced
'child' who may not, in retributive terms, deserve the death penalty."); Brief of Alabama, su-
pra note 6, at 1-2 ("[S]ome 16- and 17-year-old killers most assuredly are able to distinguish
right from wrong and to appreciate fully the consequences of their murderous actions.").
229. Roper, 543 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 570 (majority opinion) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835
(1988)).
231. Justice O'Connor recognized that many juveniles may be sufficiently mature to
know the nature of their crimes and be punished accordingly. Id. at 606 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he mitigating characteristics associated with youth do not justify an absolute age
limit. A legislature can reasonably conclude, as many have, that some 17-year-old murderers
are mature enough to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case.").
232. See id. at 574 (majority opinion). But see Hoffmann, supra note 82, at 266 ("IT]he
use of chronological age as a 'bright line,' for purposes of imposing a ban on the juvenile
death penalty, will produce comparative injustice, and such injustice is constitutionally sig-
nificant under the [E]ighth [A]mendment."); Warren M. Kato, Comment, The Juvenile Death
Penalty, 18 J. Juv. L. 112, 141 (1997) ("Line-drawing based simply upon age has no place in
the realm of the juvenile death penalty; it is unjust as well as unnecessary.").
[Vol. 42314
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Simmons, expressing their opposition to the juvenile death penalty.233
In their briefs, the groups stressed that the United States is one of the
only countries in the world to still impose the death penalty on juve-
niles.234 In addition, these briefs highlight, as mentioned by the plural-
ity, that the only other countries who have executed juveniles recently
are Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Yemen, Pakistan, and China 23 5-countries with which the United
States would generally not want to be aligned for human rights stan-
dards. The brief of former U.S. diplomats clearly manifests the large
amount of international pressure the Court faced, warning:
[A]llowing Missouri to execute Christopher Simmons will diplo-
matically isolate the United States and hinder its foreign policy
goals by alienating countries that have been American allies of long
standing.... At this critical time in our foreign policy ... the in-
sistence of a few states on continuing to execute juvenile offenders
236should not be permitted to isolate the entire nation.
The Court devoted a large portion of its plurality opinion to ad-
dressing international opinion, implying that the Court gave consider-
able weight to foreign views and was persuaded by international pres-
sure. 237  The plurality stated "[i]t is proper [to] acknowledge the
233. See Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the International
Community in Support of Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1619203
[hereinafter Brief of the European Union]; Brief of Amici Curiae Former U.S. Diplomats
Morton Abramowitz et al. in Support of Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633), 2004
WL 1636448 [hereinafter Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats]; Brief of Amici Curiae President
James Earl Carter, Jr., et al. in Support of Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1636446 [hereinafter Brief of President James Earl Carter, Jr.].
234. See, e.g., Brief of the European Union, supra note 233, at 11 ("[T]he United States,
at present, stands virtually alone among all the nations of the world in actively carrying out
death sentences for offenses committed by children."); Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats, supra
note 233, at 6 ("[T]he current U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders is manifestly in-
consistent with global standards of decency that have been embraced by nearly every nation
in the world."); Brief of President James Earl Carter, Jr., supra note 233, at 12 ("The practice
of other countries illustrates that the death penalty for child offenders is contrary to interna-
tionally accepted standards of human rights.").
235. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 577; Brief of the European Union, supra note 233, at 8-9;
Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats, supra note 233, at 16 ("Only a small handful of countries,
each of which has been consistently criticized by the United States for severe human rights
abuses, actually executes juvenile offenders .... ).
236. Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats, supra note 233, at 20.
237. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78. The Court previously looked to international views to
support its own conclusions in Atkins, Thompson, and Coker. In Atkins and Coker, however,
any mention of international viewpoints was limited to footnotes. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4, 596 n.10 (1977). In
Thompson, the Court referenced countries who "share our Anglo-American heritage" and
"leading members of the Western European community," limiting the discussion of these
countries to one paragraph. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988).
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overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty. ' 23 8 However, if the Court intended to determine the
evolving standards of decency within the United States, the views of
foreign nations should have no bearing on that decision. The plurality
sought to support its position by acknowledging that the United States
is one of only two countries not to have ratified Article 37 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the juvenile death
penalty.239 Justice Scalia was rightly unpersuaded by this argument
because Article 37 also calls for the prohibition of imposing life in
prison without possibility of parole on juvenile offenders.24° If the
Court is willing to look at international opinion only when it supports
its own subjective views, then there is no logical reason to consider it
at all in an Eighth Amendment analysis.24
In addition, state legislatures have already pondered the appropri-
ateness of the juvenile death penalty and instituted specific safeguards,
including the requirement of individualized sentencing for murder-
ers.242 It is unclear whether other countries that now prohibit the juve-
nile death penalty ever had laws in place that required individualized
consideration of each juvenile offender's case. In fact, many coun-
tries, including the entire European Union, do not allow the death
penalty under any circumstances.243 Therefore, they operate under a
fundamentally different view of penology and retribution than the
United States. If the Court is willing to rely on these countries' views
on the juvenile death penalty, perhaps the Court will be persuaded to
abolish the death penalty altogether in the future. The foundational
principles on which the United States was built differ substantially
238. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
239. Id. at 576.
240. Id. at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37,
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm.
241. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To invoke alien law when it
agrees with one's own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but
sophistry.").
242. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 106 (1982) (citing the Oklahoma
death penalty statute that takes into account mitigating circumstances in determining the ap-
propriateness of a death penalty sentence).
243. See Allen E. Shoenberger, The European View of American Justice, 36 LOY. U.
Cm. L.J. 603, 603 (2005) ("[A]II fifteen of the original European Union countries have abol-
ished the death penalty."); European Union, EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty,
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2005) (stating "[t]he European Union (EU) is opposed to the death penalty in all cases").
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from those of many other countries in the world; therefore, American
standards should not be determined by foreign legal standards. 244
B. Possible Ramifications of Roperfor the Juvenile Justice System's
Future
After Roper, it is natural to speculate that the Court's general con-
clusions regarding juveniles could eventually cause the prevailing ju-
venile justice system philosophy to shift back to one of rehabilitation,
rather than punishment or retribution. Throughout the 1990s, citizens
responded to the high juvenile crime rate and fear of super-predators
by lobbying for legislators to get tough on juvenile crime. As a result,
many juveniles every year are transferred or automatically waived into
adult court and sentenced as adults. 45 Juvenile court judges have
wholly lost jurisdiction over juveniles who commit serious crimes
and, therefore, cannot prescribe any rehabilitative treatment for these
offenders.2" The juvenile justice system, at least concerning juveniles
who commit serious crimes, has arguably focused more on retribution
than rehabilitation in recent history. 47
Roper could signal an increase in the Court's willingness to pre-
scribe appropriate sentences for juveniles. First, the country could
soon see the end of sentencing juveniles to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. According to a recent study by Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch, there are at least 2225 juvenile of-
fenders serving sentences of life without parole in the United States. 48
"In 26 states, the sentence of life without parole is mandatory for any-
one who is found guilty of committing first-degree murder, regardless
of age. ' 249 According to the study, the United States is one of the only
244. In July of 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Constitu-
tion conducted a hearing to examine the appropriate role of foreign judgments in the interpre-
tation of the Constitution of the United States.
By looking to and relying on the decisions of foreign courts in the interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States, the judiciary not only is undermining the vi-
sion of our Founding Fathers but is chipping away at the core principles on which
this country was founded, chipping away at our Nation's sovereignty and inde-
pendence.
House Resolution on the Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States: Hearing on H.R. Res. 97 Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution of the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005).
245. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 60 and accompanying text
247. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
248. Human Rights Watch, United States: Thousands of Children Sentenced to Life
Without Parole (Oct. 12, 2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/12/usdoml 1835.htm.
249. Id.
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countries in the world that imposes this sentence on juvenile offend-
ers;250 only twelve juveniles are currently serving this sentence in all
other countries combined. 5'
The Court in Roper made many statements regarding the culpabil-
ity of juveniles that seem to advocate for reform rather than harsh ret-
ribution.252 The Court recognized that "[t]he personality traits of ju-
veniles are more transitory [and] less fixed. 253 Also, "it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for
a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed. ' 254 By declaring that juveniles' conduct can never be as
morally reprehensible as adults' conduct, the Court essentially stated
that juveniles should not then be punished like adults. 5 Considering
that life in prison without the possibility of parole is the harshest sen-
tence available to adult offenders, other than the death penalty, it
would be logical to conclude that the Court might view life without a
parole as an adult punishment.
In Roper, the Court relied on very broad and conclusory state-
ments about juveniles as a class to justify its position that the death
penalty is a disproportionate sentence to a juvenile's personal culpa-
bility.2156 Therefore, if the Court granted certiorari to a juvenile chal-
lenging his life without parole sentence, the Court could strike down
the sentence as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, based on its previous conclusions in Thompson
and Roper that juveniles are less culpable than adults.
Because the Court relied on international opinion to abolish the
juvenile death penalty, the Court could also abolish life without parole
for juveniles as a result of further international pressure. Again, the
United States is one of only a few countries in the world that impose
this sentence on juveniles, and it is one of only two United Nation
Members countries that has not ratified Article 37 of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. 7
A second ramification on the juvenile justice system could be that
state legislatures will either voluntarily change their juvenile transfer
250. Id.
251. Id.; Lisa Bloom, Life, Without Possibility, COuRTTV.CoM (Oct. 25, 2005),
http://courttv.com/people/bloom.blog/102505.juvenilesctv.html.
252. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
253. Id. at 570.
254. Id.
255. See id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
256. See supra Part III.B.3.
257. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 240; Bloom, supra note
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statutes, or, in an extreme case, the Supreme Court will decide that
punishing juveniles as adults is always unconstitutional. In theory, if
the Court's decision in Roper is interpreted to mean that juveniles are
less culpable than adults-thus they should not be punished as adults,
but rather rehabilitated-many states may reconsider how they are
treating serious juvenile offenders. Rather than automatically sending
juvenile offenders to adult court, perhaps juvenile courts will retain
these offenders to rehabilitate them and prevent later patterns of
criminal behavior. According to the Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch report, "[b]y sentencing children to life without pa-
role, society tells them unequivocally that their lives are worthless,
they are beyond repair or redemption, and any effort they may make
to improve themselves is essentially futile. There is also inherent cru-
elty in denying a child any possibility of rehabilitation or reform. '258
If states decide to statutorily bring the focus of the juvenile justice sys-
tem back to one of rehabilitation, juveniles will be sentenced to life
without parole or other harsh punishments less frequently, and ideally
these juveniles could be reformed to be contributing members of soci-
ety.
V. CONCLUSION
Although no national consensus actually existed against the juve-
nile death penalty, and although some juveniles may have the requisite
maturity and intelligence to understand the consequences of their ac-
tions, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Roper v. Simmons that the
practice of sentencing juveniles to death is unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment. As a result, sixteen-year-old and seventeen-year-
old defendants, like Simmons, who strategically plan to commit mur-
der and do so in cold-blood, will not receive the ultimate penalty for
their crime. Additionally, the Court interfered with the function of
both state legislatures and sentencing juries, using its subjective views
to declare what the law should be and implying that neither legisla-
tures nor juries are competent to correctly assess the culpability of ju-
veniles and determine appropriate sentences.
In the future, the juvenile justice system may undergo changes in
both philosophy and procedure. States may begin to focus once again
on the rehabilitation of juveniles, a premise upon which juvenile
258. AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 82 (2005), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us1005/7.htm#_Tocl 14638421.
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courts were originally established. Also, the Court may strike down
as unconstitutional other adult punishments imposed on juvenile of-
fenders. Whatever actual effect this decision may have, Roper will
likely influence the fate of all future juvenile offenders, as well as
shape the framework of the Court's analysis in all future Eighth
Amendment cases.
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